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CASE COMMENTS
The court in Jefferson Standard, by extending the rule in Atlas to
apply to intercorporate distributions between companies filing con-
solidated returns, affirmed the line of decisions which hold that the
character of tax-exempt income is not such that it must be absolutely
eliminated from any consideration in the system of federal income
taxation.44 While tax-exempt income may not be directly taxed or be
used as the basis for increasing the total tax, it may be considered in
the determination of taxable income if done in a non-discriminatory
manner.
TimoTHY J. MURPHY
APPLICATION OF THE DOCTRINES OF ANCILLARY
AND PENDENT JURISDICTION TO THIRD-PARTY
PRACTICE IN FEDERAL COURTS
After a defendant to a lawsuit has impleaded a third-party defend-
ant, the plaintiff, pursuant to Rule 14(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, may amend his complaint to assert a claim, arising out of
the "same transaction or occurrence" which was the subject matter of
the principal action, directly against the third-party defendant.' How-
ever, in order to obtain federal jurisdiction over the plaintiff's third-
party claim, the majority of federal courts require that the claim be
supported by independent jurisdictional grounds.2 For many years
"Helvering v. Independent Life Ins. Co., 292 U.S. 37, (1934); Denman v.
Slayton, 282 U.S. 514 (1931); National Life Ins. Co. v. United States, 277 U.S.
508 (1928).
"FED. R. Crv. P. 14(a) provides:
(a) When Defendant may Bring in Third Party. At any time after com-
mencement of the action a defending party, as a third-party plaintiff, may
cause a summons and complaint to be served upon a person not a party
to the action who is or may be liable to him for all or part of the plaintiff's
claim against him .... The plaintiff may assert any claim against the
third-party defendant arising out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the plaintiff's claim against the third-party
plaintiff, and the third-party defendant thereupon shall assert his de-
fenses as provided in Rule 12 and his counter-claims and cross-claims as
provided in Rule 13 ....
2Friend v. Middle Atlantic Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir.) cert. denied,
328 U.S. 865 (1946); Illinois ex rel. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Maryland Cas. Co.,
132 F.2d 850, 853 (7th Cir. 1942) (concurring opinion); Palumbo v. Western Md.
Ry., 271 F. Supp. 361 (D. Md. 1967); McDonald v. Dykes, 6 F.R.D. 569 (E.D. Pa.),
aff'd per curiam, 163 F.2d 828 (3rd Cir. 1947); Hoskie v. Prudential Ins. Co. of
America, 39 F. Supp. 3o5 (E.D.N.Y. i941); cf. McPherson v. Hoffman, 275 F.2d
466 (6th Cir. 196o); Baltimore & O.R.R. v. Saunders, 159 F.2d 481 (4th Cir. 1947);
Pasternack v. Dalo, 17 F.R.D. 420 (W.D. Pa. 1955).
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both commentators3 and a significant number of federal courts4 have
questioned whether this requirement is desirable.
In Ayoub v. Helm's Express, Inc.5 the United States District Court
for the Western District of Pennsylvania denied a motion to amend
plaintiff's original complaint to include a direct claim against a third-
party defendant on two primary grounds.6 First, since there was no de-
versity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the third-party de-
fendant, the court declared that the requirement for an independent
jurisdictional basis had not been met. Second, the court declined to
invoke the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, which permits federal
courts to hear non-federal claims asserted by the plaintiff in an action
grounded on a federal question as long as the non-federal claims meet
a requisite relation to the federal claim.
7
By requiring diversity of citizenship between the plaintiff and the
third-party defendant, the court aligned itself with those jurisdictions
which are reluctant to play "fast and loose" with the jurisdictional
limitations placed on the federal judiciary by the Constitution8 and
congressional enactment.9 Although these courts concede that Rule
14 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure was promulgated in order
to provide federal courts with liberal third-party practice provisions,' 0
they are also aware of the strict prohibitions of Rule 82, which forbids
the Federal Rules from being construed so as to "extend or limit the
jurisdiction of the United States district courts . . . .11 They fear
3E.g., Fraser, Ancillary Jurisdiction and the Joinder of Claims in the Federal
Courts, 33 F.R.D. 27, 38 (1964); Holtzoff, Entry of Additional Parties in a Civil
Action, 31 F.R.D. 1o, 1o9 (1963).
'E.g., Buresch v. American LaFrance, 290 F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa. 1968); Olson
v. United States, 38 F.R.D. 489 (D. Neb. 1965); Myer v. Lyford, 2 F.R.D. 507
(M.D. Pa. 1942); Sklar v. Hayes, 1 F.R.D. 594 (E.D. Pa. 1941); Malkin v. Arundel
Corp., 36 F. Supp. 948 (D. Md. 1941).
3oo F. Supp. 473 (W.D. Pa. 1969). The confusion surrounding the require-
ment of an independent jurisdictional basis is well illustrated by the fact that less
than a year before the Ayoub decision, the very same district court had reached
the opposite result in Buresch v. American LaFrance, 29o F. Supp. 265 (W.D. Pa.
1968).
'There is also a third ground for the denial of the motion; each count of
the proposed amended complaint demanded judgment for a large specific sum
of money for unliquidated damages. The court criticized this as "surplusage and
unnecessary in a federal pleading." 300 F. Supp. at 473.
'For a discussion of the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction see text accompanying
notes 29-45 infra.
8U.S. CONSr. art. III, § 2.
'28 U.S.C. §§ 1331-32 (1964).
IOSee, e.g., Friend v. Middle Atlantic Transp. Co., 153 F.2d 778 (2d Cir. 1946).
"FED. R. CIv. P. 82 provides:
These rules shall not be construed to extend or limit the jurisdiction of
the United States district courts or the venue of actions therein ....
CASE COMMENTS
the possibility of a federal court having jurisdiction over a claim
by a citizen of one state against a co-citizen of the same state by the
circuitous means of a third-party claim-thus permitting the plaintiff
to recover by indirect means a judgment which he could not, under the
doctrine of Strawbridge v. Curtiss,12 have recovered directly.
While these courts express great apprehension of circumstances of
federal jurisdictional statutes when a plaintiff makes a third-party
claim, they continue to apply the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction 3
in order to permit the original defendant's third-party claim to be
heard. This doctrine is applied even when the -third-party defendant
is a citizen of the same state as the original defendant 14 or a citizen of
the same state as the plaintiff.'5 A number of commentators find this
inconsistency absurd and suggest that the ancillary jurisdiction doc-
trine should apply to all third-party claims.16
As first conceived in the early case of Freeman v. Howe, 7 the doc-
trine of ancillary jurisdiction merely provided a means by which a
federal court could adjudicate claims against property already under
its custody or control due to original jurisdiction over the principal
action. s In that case, a United States marshall attached certain rail-
road cars. The mortgagees of the railroad demanded the return of the
cars by writ of replevin in a state court proceeding. The United States
Supreme Court held that the state court could not interfere with the
127 U.S. (3 Cranch) 267 (18o6). According to Strawbridge, if there are several
parties on one or both sides, there is no diversity jurisdiction if one of the parties
on either side is a citizen of a state of which a party on the other side is also a
citizen.
13One authority has defined ancillary jurisdiction in the following terms:
[A] district court acquires jurisdiction of a case or controversy as an
entirety, and hence may, as an incident to disposition of a matter properly
before it, possess jurisdiction to decide other matters raised by the case of
which it could not take cognizance were they independently presented.
i W. BARRON & A. HOLTZOFF, FEDERAL PRACrIcE AND PROCEDURE § 23 (C. Wright
ed. 196o).
1Dery v. Wyer, 265 F.2d 804 (2d Cir. 1959); Waylander-Peterson Co. v. Great
Northern Ry., 2o F.2d 408 (8th Cir. 1953); Lesnik v. Public Indus. Corp., 144
F.2d 968 (2d Cir. 1944); Lewis v. United Air Lines Transp. Corp., 29 F. Supp. 112
(D. Conn. 1939).
2Illinois ex rel. Trust Co. of Chicago v. Maryland Cas. Co., 132 F.2d 85o, 853
(7 th Cir. 1952) (concurring opinion); William v. Keyes, 125 F.2d 2o8 (5 th Cir.), cert
denied, 316 U.S. 699 (1942); Crum v. Appalachian Elec. Power Co., 27 F. Supp. 138
(S.D. W.Va. 1939).
"E.g., I-oltzoff, Entry of Additional Parties in a Civil Action, 31 F.R.D. lo,
11o (1963).
2765 U.S. (24 How.) 450 (i86o).
1 See Note, Ancillary Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 48 IowA L. REV. 383,
384-85 (1963).
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seized property which was under the exclusive control of the federal
court. If the mortgagees had desired to dispute the title to the property,
they could have proceeded to assert their claim in a federal court as a
claim "ancillary" to the principal action. No showing of diversity of
citizenship was required.
An important expansion of the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction
occurred in Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange.19 The plaintiff in
Moore had obtained federal jurisdiction by alleging a violation of the
Sherman Anti-Trust Act.20 By compulsory counter-claim, which did
not involve a federal question, the defendant was awarded an injunc-
tion in spite of the fact that the plaintiff's claim had been dismissed on
its merits. Thus the Court began to use the doctrine of ancillary juris-
diction as a means of resolving multi-claims arising out of the same
"transaction or occurrence"21 even though one of those claims might
not have an independent federal jurisdictional basis. 22 However, only
those claims whose resolution was required in order for the federal
court to render a complete, effective, and equitable adjudication of
the issue in the principal proceeding would be considered ancillary.23
Following the adoption of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the
federal courts employed the Moore interpretation of the doctrine of
ancillary jurisdiction in order to provide jurisdictional justification for
their liberal provisions regarding compulsory counter-claims, 24 cross-
claims, 25 interpleader,26 intervention, 27, and, as already noted, some
aspects of impleader. 2s
The court in Ayoub also rejected the plaintiff's assertion that his
third-party claim should be allowed under the doctrine of pendent
19270 U.S. 593 (1926).
15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1964).
2 1For an excellent analysis of the term "transaction or occurrence," see, Wright,
Estoppel by Rule: The Compulsory Counterclaim under Modern Pleading, 39
IOWA L. Rlv. 255, 270-78 (1954).
'Cases cited notes 14 and 15 supra; cases cited notes 24-26 infra.
mNote, Ancillary Jurisdiction of the Federal Courts, 48 IowA L. REV. 383,
384 (1963).
"'Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Great Lakes Rubber
Corp. v. Herbert Cooper Co., 286 F.2d 631 (3 d Cir. 1961).15R. M. Smythe & Co. v. Ohase Natl Bank, 291 F.2d 721 (2d Cir. 1961); Childress
v. Cook, 245 F.2d 798 (5th Cir. 1957).
28See, e.g., Walmac Co. v. Isaacs, 220 F.2d io8 (ist Cir. 1955).
21Cases involving intervention as of right under FED. R. Clv. P. 24(a) require
no independent grounds of jurisdiction. See, e.g., East v. Crowdus, 302 F.2d 645
(8th Cir. 1962). However, most jurisdictions require independent grounds of
jurisdiction for permissive intervention under FED. R. CIi. P. 24(b). See, e.g.,
Hunt Tool Co. v. Moore, Inc., 212 F.2d 685 (5th Cir. 1954).
21Cases cited notes 14 and 15 supra.
[Vol. XXVII
CASE COMMENTS
jurisdiction. According to this judicially created doctrine, 29 "original
jurisdiction vesting on the basis of a plantiff's federal claim extend...
to any non-federal claim that the plaintiff may have against the same
defendant, so long as it bears the requisite relationship to the federal
claims." 30 If such a relationship does exist, the doctrine of pendent
jurisdiction gives a federal court discretion to exercise its jurisdiction
over the non-federal claim in light of the degree of judicial economy
and convenience to the parties which would be achieved.
Until recently, Hum v. Oursler3 governed the application of pen-
dent jurisdiction to cases in federal courts. In Hum, plaintiffs sought,
under a federal statute, to enjoin infringement of their copyrighted
play by the defendants and, under a state statute, to recover damages
for unfair competition. 32 The trial court dismissed both claims-the
federal claim on its merits and the state claim for lack of jurisdiction.33
The court of appeals affirmed.34 However, the United States Supreme
Court found the district court in error. It held -that the unfair competi-
tion claim, founded on a state statute, should have been dismissed on
its merits rather than for lack of jurisdiction.35 In other words, the
Court concluded that the federal copyright claim had provided a suffici-
ent basis for the adjudication of the state claim regarding unfair com-
petition. Perhaps even more significant was the adoption of a two-part
test for determining the existence of a pendent claim. First, the federal
claim must not be "plainly wanting in substance." 36 Second, the federal
and state claims must constitute "two distinct grounds in support of a
single cause of action" rather than "two separate and distinct causes of
action."3
7
For more than three decades, lower federal courts had great diffi-
culty interpreting the Hum "single cause of action" test. While some
2UMW v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715 (1966); Hum v. Oursler, 289 U.S. 238 (1933).
However, in 1948, Congress enacted a law to govern the application of pendent
jurisdiction with regard to copyright, patent, and trademark cases. 28 U.S.C. §
1338(b) (1964) (originally enacted as Act of June 25, 1948, ch. 646, § 13 3 8(b), 62
Stat. 931).
®Note, The Evolution and Scope of the Doctrine of Pendent Jurisdiction in the
Federal Courts, 62 COLUm. L. RaEv. 1O18 (1962).
"289 U.S. 238 (1933).
"A third count alleged infringement and unfair competition of a revised
uncopyrighted version of the play. The Supreme Court affirmed the district court's
jurisdictional dismissal of this claim.
1289 U.S. at 239-4o. The district court opinion appears not to have been
reported.
"Hurn v. Oursler, 61 F.2d 1O31 (2d Cir. 1932) (per curiam).
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courts required almost complete proof of identical facts in order to
apply pendent jurisdiction,38 others required merely a substantial over-
lapping of proof.39 The 1966 case of UMW v. Gibbs4O provided the
Court with an opportunity to discard the highly controversial Hum
tests. The Court, endeavoring to clarify the requisite relationship be-
tween state and federal claims, proposed the following standard:
The state and federal claims must derive from a common
nucleus of operative fact. But if, considered without regard to
their federal or state character, a plaintiff's claims are such that
he would ordinarily be expected .to try them all in one judicial
proceeding, then, assuming substantiality of the federal issues,
there is power in federal courts to hear the whole. 41
Gibbs emphasized that although the trial court may find that the
claims are so related as to grant power to hear the entire case, the trial
court may nevertheless refuse to employ the pendent jurisdiction doc-
trine in situations where little "judicial economy, convenience and
fairness to litigants" would result.4
2
The Gibbs court, striving not only to assure the rational exercise
of discretion under the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction, but also to
provide a measure of predictability for the plaintiff who desires -to as-
sert parallel federal and state rights, suggested certain guidelines for
determining whether or not a non-federal claim should be deemed
pendent. In formulating such standards, the Court recognized that
federal courts should not, in the interest of comity between state and
federal courts, determine issues which might more appropriately be
left to state courts.43 Thus,
MSee, e.g., Armstrong Paint & Varnish Works v. Nu-Enamel Corp., 305 U.S.
315 (1938) ("substantially identical"); Brown v. Bullock, 194 F. Supp. 207 (S.D.N.Y.
1961); Darwin v. Jess Hickey Oil Corp., 153 F. Supp. 667 (N.D. Tex. 1957).
This is the majority view in the patent, copyright, and trademark cases due
to the provisions in 28 U.S.C. § 13 3 8(b) (1964). See, e.g., Travel Magazine, Inc.
v. Travel Digest, Inc., 191 F. Supp. 830 (S.D.N.Y. 1961). The best expression of this
interpretation of the Hum "single cause of action" test is in the following opinions
by Judge Clark: Kleinman v. Betty Dain Creations, Inc., 189 F.2d 546, 549 (2d
Cir. 1951) (dissent); Musher Foundation, Inc. v. Alba Trading Co., 127 F.2d 9,
11 (2d Cir.) (dissent), cert. denied, 317 U.S. 641 (1942); Treasure Imports Inc. v.
Henry Amdur 8c Sons, Inc., 127 F.2d 3 (2d Cir. 1942).
40383 U.S. 715 (1966).
Wid. at 725. It appears that pendent jurisdiction ("common nucleus of opera-
tive fact") and ancillary jurisdiction ("same occurrence or transaction") require




[where] state issues substantially predominate, whether in
terms of proof, of the scope of the issues raised, or of the com-
prehensiveness of the remedy sought, the state claims may be
dismissed without prejudice and left for resolution to state tri-
bunals.
44
However, if the state issues turn on principles well-settled under state
law, a federal court should be less hesitant to apply pendent jurisdic-
tion. On the other hand, if there is some uncertainty as to the state
law, the federal court should limit its adjudication to the federal claim
since the state courts are best equipped to explore new areas of state
law.45 Finally, the Gibbs court indicated that federal courts may con-
sider such extra-jurisdictional problems as the possibility of jury con-
fusion in treating the "divergent legal theories of relief" that under
Federal Rule 4 2(b) would justify separating the state and federal claims
for trial.46 If there is the likelihood of such confusion, the federal
court should decline to exercise pendent jurisdiction. By proposing
such criteria, the Gibbs court moved to replace the rigid dual require-
ment of Hum with a more flexible means of determining the existence
of pendent claims.
Using the Gibbs analysis, the Ayoub court found it could deny
plaintiff's motion to amend his complaint to assert a claim directly
against the third-party defendant on two grounds. First, Gibbs required
that -the original action involve a federal claim. Since the principal
action in Ayoub was based on diversity of citizenship, there was no
power to invoke the doctrine of pendent jurisdiction.47 In the alter-
native, even if pendent jurisdiction were determined by a higher court
to extend to diversity actions, the Ayoub court would nevertheless de-
cline to exercise its discretion to apply the doctrine since it would be
adjudicating claims which belonged in state courts.
Thus, neither the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction nor the doctrine
of pendent jurisdiction convinced the Ayoub court to grant plaintiff's
motion. Although Gibbs has precluded the use of pendent jurisdiction
in a federal court in order to permit plaintiff to assert a direct claim
against a co-citizen, third-party defendant where the original ac-
tion is based on diversity of citizenship, it is likely that future courts
might allow third-party claims in such a situation if the plaintiff presses
the persuasive arguments in favor of the doctrine of ancillary juris-
Uld. at 726-27.
v-See, Wechsler, Federal Jurisdiction and the Revision of the Judicial Code, 13
LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 216, 223 (1948).
4383 U.S. 715 (1966).
' 7See, e.g., Olivieri v. Adams, 280 F. Supp. 428 (E.D. Pa. 1968).
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